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REFLECTIONS ON SYSTEMIC RISK 
REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO KARMEL’S 
PAPER 
Annette L. Nazareth* 
n her very thoughtful article, Professor Karmel proposes the estab-
lishment of a systemic risk regulator modeled after the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) or the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The proposed systemic risk regulator would be primarily re-
sponsible for issuing warnings and making recommendations relating to 
systemic risks. It would have no regulatory and supervisory authority and 
would be highly independent with limited accountability. This essay 
takes a contrary position—that a systemic risk regulator that has no regu-
latory and supervisory functions and that is institutionally segregated or 
independent from those functions is unlikely to be effective and compe-
tent in policing systemic risks. It then discusses the information needs for 
systemic risk regulation and argues that systemic risk regulation and pru-
dential regulation are closely interconnected and highly complementary. 
Finally, it briefly touches on the issue of accountability. 
Systemic risk analysis is an information and data intensive endeavor. 
Thus, a crucial element in any institutional design for systemic risk regu-
lation is how to collect and aggregate relevant information and make in-
formed decisions in an efficient and effective manner. 
Systemic risk regulation involves regular collection and analysis of a 
large amount of disparate information encompassing the entire financial 
system both at the macro- and micro-levels. At the macro-level, the in-
formation consists of those relating to macroeconomic conditions, finan-
cial markets and related infrastructures, payment and settlement systems, 
and the intersections between financial sectors and the real economy. At 
the micro-level, it involves regular collection and monitoring of a wide 
range of firm-level information, particularly for systemically important 
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financial institutions, such as on- and off-balance sheet items with ap-
propriate breakdowns of exposures and identification of counterparties, 
capital, liquidity and risk management, compensation, and governance 
practices.1 
In particular, systemic risk analysis often entails horizontal reviews of 
information across groups of financial institutions, focusing on particular 
risks or activities, common exposures, and “crowded trades,” preferably 
on a real-time basis.2 A systemic risk regulator must possess deep market 
and institutional knowledge, analytical sophistication and supervisory 
expertise to be competent in carrying out such analysis.3  What makes 
this type of analysis particularly challenging in practice is the constantly 
changing and continuously evolving nature of the financial markets as a 
result of market movements, innovations and financial integration.4 New 
market developments appear to occur at an ever-accelerating pace. Even 
the most intimate and sophisticated market observers, regulators and 
market participants find it challenging to stay abreast of and comprehend 
the impact of these changes. The effects of the “originate to distribute” 
model of securitized credit intermediation and the accompanying explo-
sive growth in subprime lending that contributed to the present financial 
crisis is one case in point. 
Thus, whether the Federal Reserve adds a systemic risk function to its 
current supervisory and regulatory responsibilities, or a council of regu-
lators aggregates their collective information and experience to serve the 
systemic risk role, ultimately, functional regulators must play a key role 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Exec. Bd. Member, Eur. Cent. Bank, Going Forward: 
Regulation and Supervision after the Financial Turmoil, Speech at the International Con-
ference of Financial Regulation and Supervision (June 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090619.en.html. 
 2. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys-
tem, Reducing Systemic Risk, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City An-
nual Symposium (Aug. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm; see also Ben 
S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve System, Financial 
Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve, Speech at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Economic Conference (Oct. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091023a.htm. 
 3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys-
tem, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (Mar. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
 4. See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Exec. Bd. Member, Eur. Cent. Bank, Going Forward: 
Regulation and Supervision after the Financial Turmoil, Speech at the International Con-
ference of Financial Regulation and Supervision (June 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090619.en.html. 
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in an effective systemic risk regulatory regime.5 A systemic risk regula-
tor that has no supervisory and regulatory role could theoretically rely on 
data provided by the functional regulators, but the information would be 
derivative and may lag real-time events due to coordination issues. This 
could be problematic, particularly in times of crisis. Given that the U.S. 
regulatory framework will likely remain fragmented after the anticipated 
legislative reforms to financial regulation, a council of regulators would 
be conducive to the information aggregation process, whether as an advi-
sory body to a systemic risk regulator or as a body with systemic risk 
authority itself. 
Additionally, systemic risk regulation and functional regulation are 
closely interconnected and highly complementary. A distinct separation 
of systemic risk regulation and functional regulation runs the risk that 
neither regulatory function performs satisfactorily. In practice, most im-
portant macro-prudential instruments for systemic risk regulation have to 
work through the micro-prudential regulatory and supervisory process in 
a dynamic, tailored fashion in response to evolving market conditions 
and risk correlations over the economic cycle.6 
Theoretical literature on systemic risk regulation considers two dimen-
sions: “cross-sectional dimension” and “time dimension.”7 Cross-
                                                                                                                                     
 5. In the European Union, the proposed European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and 
the European System of Supervisory Authorities (ESSA) are institutionally inter-locked 
in that the members of the ESRB include the three Chairs of the ESSA. To ensure further 
coordination and cooperation with the national prudential regulators, a representative 
from one national supervisory authority for each EU country may attend the meetings of 
the ESRB, though they will have no voting rights. 
 6. See e.g., Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l. Settlements, & Chair-
man, Fin. Stability Forum, Marrying the Micro- and Macro-Prudential Dimensions of 
Financial Stability (Sept. 21, 2000), available at 
http://www.bis.org/review/rr000921b.pdf; Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Fin. Stabili-
ty, Bank of Eng., The Debate on Financial System Resilience: Macroprudential Instru-
ments, Speech at Barclays Annual Lecture (Oct. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech407.pdf; Jukka Vesa-
la, Deputy Dir. Gen., Finnish Fin. Supervisory Auth., How to Bring In Systemic Risk 
Considerations into Financial Regulation and Supervision?, Speech at the SUERF Collo-
quium on “The Quest for Stability” (Sept. 3–4, 2009), available at  
http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/Esitelmat/Documents/Vesala_SUERF_speec
h_030909.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial 
Supervision and Regulation? (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 128, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=841306; Andrew Crock-
ett, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l. Settlements, & Chairman, Fin. Stability Forum, Marry-
ing the Micro- and Macro-Prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability (Sept. 21, 2000), 
available at http://www.bis.org/review/rr000921b.pdf; Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, 
Bank for Int’l. Settlements, The International Policy Response to Financial Crises: Mak-
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sectional dimension refers to the distribution of risk within the financial 
system at a given point in time by acting on its inter-connectedness. A 
key policy concern of cross-dimensional dimension is how to address 
common exposures that could ripple through the system and impose 
stresses on a significant number of financial institutions. Time dimension 
relates to how aggregate risks evolve over time in an economic cycle. A 
key policy concern of time dimension is how to address the problems of 
pro-cyclicality. Both dimensions of systemic risk regulation require a 
calibrated approach through the regulatory and supervisory review 
process. For the cross-sectional dimension, capital, liquidity, and risk 
management requirements need to be tailored and dynamically adjusted 
based on the systemic significant of individual institutions. Further, the 
larger, more complex or systemically important financial institutions 
warrant particular attention. Examples of such calibration include a “sys-
temic capital surcharge” or an institution-specific systemic insurance 
premium calculated along a spectrum, rather than based on categorical 
classification. For the time dimension, regulatory regimes for counter-
cyclical capital buffers and more forward-looking countercyclical loan 
provisioning are currently under consideration by national regulators and 
international bodies. To reduce the amplitude of the economic and finan-
cial cycles, appropriate levels of buffers or provisioning may need ad-
justment over time. 
To effectively identify emerging strains and imbalances and address 
them through proper regulatory calibration in a timely manner, a system-
ic risk regulator must have a deep knowledge and understanding of, and 
have regular and close contacts with, financial markets and intermedia-
ries. In particular, to implement such calibrated prudential standards, a 
robust regime for systemic risk regulation must ensure that all systemi-
cally important financial institutions are subject to consolidated supervi-
sion. A systemic risk regulator that is functionally separate from the reg-
ulatory and supervisory process is unlikely to be competent in carrying 
out such an extraordinarily complex task. 
Lastly, systemic risk regulation is a multifaceted and multidisciplinary 
task that requires policy coordination and cooperation involving many 
authorities with different perspectives and responsibilities, both domesti-
                                                                                                                                     
ing the Macroprudential Approach Operational, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Annual Symposium (Aug. 21–22, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp090911.htm; Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Fin. Stabili-
ty, Bank of Eng., The Debate on Financial System Resilience: Macroprudential Instru-
ments, Speech at Barclays Annual Lecture (Oct. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech407.pdf. 
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cally and internationally.8 For instance, to design a regulatory regime for 
dynamic loan provisioning would require the involvement of accounting 
standard setters, tax authorities and functional regulators. In particular, 
regardless of the institution framework for financial supervision, infor-
mation-sharing and decision-making linkages between the central bank 
and other regulatory agencies are necessary to effectively identify and 
address systemic risks.9 In addition to its critical role as a lender of last 
resort, the Federal Reserve has broad expertise and deep knowledge in 
financial markets, infrastructures, and intermediaries. This is due to its 
role as an umbrella supervisor for bank holding companies, its role in the 
payment and settlement systems and its active monitoring of the capital 
markets in support of its monetary policy. Thus, as a practical matter, it 
is essential to have involvement of the Federal Reserve in systemic risk 
regulation, whether or not it is in the lead role.10 
INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Professor Karmel’s proposal to establish a highly independent system-
ic risk regulator is rooted in the notion that prior to the recent financial 
crisis, prudential regulators were either subject to political interference or 
“captured” by the industries they regulated. 
Agency independence has two dimensions—independence from politi-
cal interference and independence from industry interests. Critics of 
agency independence hold that independence could make agencies too 
powerful and jeopardize the democratic accountability of the regulatory 
process. In particular, without proper political oversight and control, in-
dependent agencies are prone to “regulatory capture.”11 Agencies that 
                                                                                                                                     
 8. See Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l. Settlements, & Chairman, 
Fin. Stability Forum, Marrying the Micro- and Macro-Prudential Dimensions of Financial 
Stability (Sept. 21, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/review/rr000921b.pdf; see also 
Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l. Settlements, The International Policy Re-
sponse to Financial Crises: Making the Macroprudential Approach Operational, Remarks 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Annual Symposium (Aug. 21-22, 2009), 
available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp090911.htm. 
 9. See GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES 
AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, (2008), available at 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/panels/fa/papers/fa0223cb1-837-3-e.pdf. 
 10. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys-
tem, Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk, Speech at the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (Mar. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
 11. See generally Cosmo Graham, Is There a Crisis in Regulatory Accountability?, in 
A READER ON REGULATION (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 1998); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION (1980); Katjia Sander Johannesen, AFK FORLAGET, 
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suffer from regulatory capture promote industry interests or individual 
private interests over the public interest. These justifiable concerns call 
for proper accountability arrangements as the countervailing power to 
agency independence. However, independence and accountability are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. With properly designed accountability 
arrangements, independence and accountability can be highly comple-
mentary.12 Proper accountability arrangements reinforce an agency’s in-
dependence by enhancing its legitimacy and encouraging it to adhere to 
high standards of governance and performance. In addition, they enhance 
an agency’s integrity and thus reduce the possibility of regulatory cap-
ture. 
Few will quibble with the notion that functional regulators made mis-
takes leading up to the financial crisis. However, the more likely causes 
were neither political interference nor regulatory capture, but rather an 
inability to comprehend what was occurring across the financial system 
due to regulatory fragmentation and a failure to detect certain signals that 
were clearly evident. 
After many months of debate, there appears to be widespread consen-
sus that a systemic risk regulator with a broad perspective and pervasive 
authority over financial market activity is necessary and advisable to en-
sure the stability of the financial system. It will be imperative that what-
ever agency performs this essential role operate under clear legislative 
mandates and to the full extent possible, free of political interference. 
That said, this essential function must be reportable to Congress and, ul-
timately, the American taxpayers who will bear the consequences of its 
actions. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Regulatory Independence in Theory and Practice—a Survey of Independent Energy Reg-
ulators in Eight European Countries (2003), available at 
www.akf.dk/udgivelser/2003/pdf/regulatory_independence.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Marc Quintyn, Independent Agencies: More Than a Cheap Copy of 
Independent Central Banks?, 20 CONST. POL. ECON. (2009); Marc Quintyn & Michael W. 
Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability, (Int’l Mone-
tary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/46, 2002), available at 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0246.pdf; Eva Hupkes, March Quintyn & 
Michael W. Taylor, Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators, IMF 
ECON. ISSUES 39 (2006), available at 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues39/ei39.pdf. 
 
